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WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITU-
TIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, 
CHARACI'ER, AND COMMUNITY. By James Boyd 
White. 1 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1984. Pp. 
xvi, 377. $25.00. 
James M O'Fallon 2 
When Words Lose Their Meaning brings to mind Arthur Leff's 
tribute to Grant Gilmore, particularly its closing lines: "Ulti-
mately, the law is not something that we know, but something that 
we do. All right, all right, amen. But at least there is this: on the 
way to those final defeats, there are, at least for some, some beauti-
ful innings." 3 
How can a book, the bulk of which is given to readings of Ho-
mer, Thucydides, Plato, Swift, Johnson, Austen, and Burke, claim 
to be a book that is "about law from beginning to end"? White 
explains this claim by saying that one of the book's objects is "to set 
forth a rather different conception of law from those that presently 
prevail in academic circles: as an art essentially literary and rhetor-
ical in nature, a way of establishing meaning and constituting com-
munity in language."4 That is an ambitious project, if intended to 
displace presently prevailing conceptions. But a more modest inter-
pretation is suggested by the closing paragraph of the preface. 
At one time I thought of calling this an essay toward the definition of a new 
subject, with a new method, linking the fields of law and literature and perhaps 
classics and anthropology as well. I might even have given it a name. . . . But 
perhaps the simple truth is that, as I read these texts, they constitute a world for 
me, a world I see as one, and in this book I invite the reader to share its life. 5 
With this gentle invitation to share a view of a world, White avoids 
the "mendacious tendency (which, I suppose, is the defining false-
hood of all scholarship): to see all that is as in theory understanda-
ble. "6 Rather, he offers a view of law that is both illuminating and 
I. Professor of Law, Professor of English, Adjunct Professor of Classical Studies, Uni-
versity of Michigan. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Oregon. 
3. Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L. J. 989, 1011 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
4. WHITE, supra, at xi. 
5. /d. at xiii. 
6. Leff, supra note 3, at 1011. 
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potentially healing. 
White's book is informed by a conception of language as a re-
flexive activity: "individual people . . . at once form and are 
formed by their language and the events of their world. When lan-
guage changes meaning, the world changes meaning, and we are 
part of the world." The book promotes a "way of reading" that 
eschews the reductionism common to theories of interpretation 
(meaning is the writer's intent, meaning is the reader's response, 
and so on) in favor of an effort to understand the relationships be-
tween writer and language, writer and audience, established by the 
text. 1 White chooses his texts to emphasize the reciprocal relation-
ship between language and culture by focusing on situations in 
which the two have become unstuck. As he explains, "[O]ne will 
normally see that one's language is contingent, not necessary, only 
if one experiences a basic cultural dislocation: the sense that words 
have lost their meaning."s 
White fleshes out his theory with readings of particular texts. 
White's readings are elegant, careful, and provocative. An attempt 
to render them within the scope of a review would be tendentious, 
probably feckless, certainly impertinent. I shall avoid so unpromis-
ing a task, and confine my remaining remarks to efforts to place 
White's book within the unruly discipline that is the province of this 
journal. 
Contemporary constitutional theory exemplifies the relation-
ship between cultural dislocation and loss of meaning that is 
White's subject. It is hard to imagine a major constitutional scholar 
of the 1980's making a career on the kind of work done by Thomas 
Reed Powell, for example.9 Powell's confident discussion of sub-
stantive issues has given way to a preoccupation with the feasibility 
of saying anything meaningful. To the ancient battle between "lib-
eral" and "strict" construction, we have added deconstruction. 
To the lexicon of constitutional argument, we have added "inter-
pretivism" and "noninterpretivism," "originalism" and 
"nonoriginalism." 
Someday, a Pocockian student of lange and parofew may tell a 
story about how critics of Gilded Era constitutional practice, work-
ing with terms borrowed from that practice but turned to other 
ends, undermined the legitimacy of the practice itself; how they and 
7. WHITE, supra, at 4-6. 
8. /d. at 277. 
9. T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
(1956). 
10. J. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE AND HISTORY 5-12 (1985). 
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their successors tried to reconstitute the practice without recogniz-
ing that they had eaten away the ground upon which it had stood; 
how this all came tumbling down around their ears as they sought 
to sustain claims of justice in a language they had drained of mean-
ing. That student will be able to draw on White's reading of Thu-
cydides, in which he explains how a rhetoric of pure self-interestii 
forfeits the capacity for practical reason.12 
More generally, White's alternative conception of law speaks 
suggestively to the endemic view that, in the absence of transcen-
dental grounding for norms, law must be restricted to an instrumen-
tal function, implementing values chosen elsewhere. He says: 
The law is best regarded not so much as a set of rules and doctrines or as a 
bureaucratic system or as an instrument for social control but as a culture, for the 
most part a culture of argument. It is a way of making a world with a life and a 
value of its own. The conversation that it creates is at once its method and its point, 
and its object is to give to the world it creates the kind of intelligibility that results 
from the simultaneous recognition of contrasting positions. This recognition is nec-
essary to the rational definition and pursuit even of the most selfish ends. Without 
it, neither reason nor ambition can have form or meaning.I3 
A persistent theme in contemporary political theory is the im-
portance of community as the source of enduring meaning, and thus 
as the source of significance for human action and human lives, and 
the responsibility of liberal individualism for the destruction of 
community. Community is today a term of near-universal approba-
tion (how many appeals to your better side have been made in the 
name of some community: the university community, the commu-
nity of scholars, the intellectual community, the conservative com-
munity, the liberal community, and so on?). It is a term open for 
appropriation in the battle against whatever one takes to be the cen-
tral malaise of the times. 
One of the virtues of White's book is that, having established 
the significance of community, he does not require too much of it. 
Community is necessary to meaning (and because meaning is neces-
sary to the good life, so is community) but not sufficient to human 
ends. White writes of texts that seek to create their ideal reader-
thus creating a community of two between reader and writer-and, 
in the case of law especially, of the effort to create a community 
among readers.I4 But he also acknowledges the responsibility of 
II. E.g., "[A]lllaw means I will kill you if necessary to make you conform to require-
ments." Justice Holmes in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LEITERS 16 (M. Howe ed. 1953). 
12. WHITE, supra, at 76. 
13. /d. at 267. Cf the arguments concerning the theory of self interest in D. PARFIT, 
REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). 
14. WHITE, supra, at 271. 
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readers to decide whether to become part of the community that the 
writing attempts to fashion. Is 
The day may come when we can see that insistence on respon-
sibility as liberalism's contribution to creation of a community that 
takes seriously the ideal of justice for all. White's book is a step in 
that direction. It is also an example of "law and" that Arthur Leff 
certainly would have appreciated. Professor White has given us one 
of those "beautiful innings." 
15. /d. at 272· 73. 
